


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### Listening to local voices: Tuvaluans respond to climate change

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## Listening to local voices: Tuvaluans respond to climate change

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Climate change has become a permanent feature on the global media scene and in the decision-making of policy makers. The voices of academics, scientists, politicians and commentators dominate the climate change debate, yet local knowledges and beliefs, local realities, as well as local voices and actions are essential elements of navigating the way forward. Drawing on Paton's postgraduate research, this paper broadens the current dialogue by providing a platform for grassroots Tuvaluan voices to enter the climate change debate. It explores their local realities, knowledges and beliefs, and captures what Tuvaluans hold dear – factors which must play a central role in decision-making processes. To ensure the local population is fully mobilised, it will be argued that processes for engaging local voices must build on existing forums for engagement.

**Keywords:** participation; climate change; Tuvalu

### Introduction

Tuvalu has become “the poster child” for climate change discussion among the many academics, scientists, politicians and commentators that dominate the climate change debate, especially as a result of scientific predictions that Tuvalu's small population are likely to be forced to migrate within the next 50–100 years. To what extent does this portrayal of Tuvalu and its people fit with local knowledges, beliefs and realities? Is this how local Tuvaluans wish to frame the climate change debate? As will also be argued, the success of efforts to respond to climate change depend greatly on having an engaged and mobilised local population, and people who are engaged in decision-making and responsive action at all levels of society – family, community, national and global. Yet, to what degree has this level of participation been a reality in Tuvalu?

Drawing on Paton's postgraduate research, this paper adds to the current dialogue by providing a platform for grassroots Tuvaluan voices to enter the climate change debate. This paper responds to questions such as: how does climate change fit within Tuvaluan realities? To what extent do people wish to participate in a national climate change response and through which mechanisms do they wish to respond? And, considering that they have a history of voluntary migration, how are Tuvaluans positioning themselves in relation to suggestions that they may be forced to leave their lands? Finally, what are some of the

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constraints to Tuvaluans participating in responding to climate change? The paper concludes with some reflective comments and suggestions.

### **The importance of local**

The assumptions for this paper are first, that having your voice heard and your actions counted is fundamental to the well-being of individuals, families and communities (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2005). Second, that multiple perspectives help paint a fuller picture of the realities in which communities operate (Liedtka 1998); that they create a greater pool of knowledge from which creative solutions can be made; and that “outside resources will be much more effectively used if the local community is itself fully mobilized and invested” (Kretzman and McKnight 1993, p. 7). Participation is also “the Pacific way”. It is this community orientation that is one of the greatest factors of community resilience in Pacific societies (South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Government of Japan and Japanese Environmental Cooperation Centre (JECC) 1996). Finally, it is given that participation requires ensuring as many voices as possible are heard – male and female, old and young, rural and urban – and, that these voices are best captured through the use of familiar institutions and networks (World Bank 2000).

### **The research process**

Data for this paper were drawn primarily from Paton’s postgraduate research<sup>1</sup> and as the research focus was on participation, participatory principles infused the study design, data collection, analysis and information dissemination.

This research was informed by both primary and secondary research methods. A literature review was undertaken in the first instance. The United Nations (2002) has noted the difficulties in ensuring reliable data in many Pacific small nation states and so it was anticipated that gaps in the literature would be filled through discussions with key informants. This proved correct. The secondary research was followed by primary research during a 6-week period in July–August 2008. This comprised interviews with key informants, community-based interviews, workshops and participant observation. The choice of when to use community interviews and workshops, and what language to use was guided by local advice, the time available and resources. The interviews were semi-structured, while the community workshops were facilitated to ensure more hands-on participation, and where possible, enable participants to analyse the information they had generated themselves, for example, through ranking exercises.

It was not possible to visit all eight of Tuvalu’s outer islands. However, attempts were made to ensure representation from each of these islands in the data collection processes and a balanced representation by gender and age. Because views about migration were central to this study, the researcher also visited Kioia Island (Fiji) and interviewed six members of that Tuvaluan community. The Kioia Island community was established by families from Vaitupu (a Tuvaluan island) which migrated there in 1947.<sup>2</sup> Another 14 interviews were carried out in Auckland, New Zealand – Auckland has the largest Tuvaluan population outside Tuvalu.<sup>3</sup> All told, 49% of the community participants were female and, in recognition of the fact that Tuvalu’s population is a very young one, three quarters were under 50 years of age. This number included 16 students from Motufoua High School, which is located on Vaitupu. In total, 100 participants took part in the community interviews and workshops.

At the time of the research, participants were living in:

- Funafuti, Tuvalu – the capital and most urban community (28 participants).
- The Tuvaluan outer islands of Nukufetau (7 participants) and Vaitupu (29). Vaitupu was chosen because the Motufoua High School is located there and because of its links with the Kioa Island settlement in Fiji. The choice of Nukufetau from among the smaller of the Tuvalu Islands was highly influenced by boat availability.
- Fiji, mainly Kioa Island (6), where Vaitupuan migrated in 1947.
- New Zealand, principally Auckland (14).

Research limitations include the fact that this study reports the voices of a small group of people at one point in time and so findings cannot be generalised. Second, information was collected in a cross-cultural context and through language intermediaries. The contribution of these local experts is noted with great appreciation. Third, the data were collected over a limited time period, the difficulties of which were compounded by the irregularity and uncertainty of inter-island travel. These and other circumstances made it difficult to develop sufficient rapport with participants, to schedule appointments and keep in touch with participants after the initial research.

This paper is in three sections. First is a discussion about Tuvalu's physical, social, cultural and economic environment which sets the research context. This country profile has been drawn from the literature and is backed by information provided by the key informants. Section two presents the peoples' voices or, how participants framed their understandings about participation and climate change. This discussion is presented in four parts: local knowledge and beliefs about climate change; the need to plan for and participate in planning; views about the possibility of forced migration; and, participants' perceptions of avenues for future participation. The paper concludes with some reflections.

## Tuvalu

Tuvalu is one of the few island states in the South Pacific that is made up entirely of low-lying atolls. As documented by Faaniu *et al.* (1976), the nine Tuvaluan islands each have their own unique history and characteristics. Each island is separated from the others and from the capital of Funafuti by huge tracts of ocean. They are connected by intermittent and irregular boat trips which complete circuits of a selection of islands fortnightly. This isolation and distance means that communities have always relied on their own resources, institutions and systems of governance to ensure harmony and protection and to meet their own basic needs.

The United Nations (2002) has described Tuvalu's atolls as "among the planet's harshest environments". Although Tuvalu's soil is poor and there is not much diversity in flora and fauna, people have always used their resources to meet their dietary needs. As is well argued, Tuvaluans were self-sufficient until the introduction of the cash economy (Niuatui 1991) and now money and imported goods have grown increasingly important. Today, two parallel economies organise side-by-side: a largely semi-subsistence economy operating in the outer islands and a predominantly cash economy based around Funafuti, the capital and seat of government and commerce.

While it has been predicted that Tuvalu is in danger of missing a number of Millennium Development Goal targets (Government of Tuvalu and United Nations Development Programme Fiji Multi-Country Office (UNDP) 2008), it is notable that despite their limited monetary resources, participants said they did not consider that "poverty" existed in Tuvalu as the land and the sea provided for peoples' basic needs, while their culture and traditions gave them social protection.

As in other Pacific nations, the extended family is the main organisational unit in Tuvalu and the agency by which individuals share resources, contribute and participate in the wider community. Each family has access to the family lands which, as described by Manuella (1997), are the source of personal and cultural identity, spiritual well-being and family security. Land is also linked to dignity and an ability to live a decent life (see Huffer and Rakuita 2005). Traditionally, land and *pulaka*<sup>4</sup> pits represented status and wealth within Tuvaluan communities, especially in the rural areas. It is this sense of identity, continuity and well being (symbolised in customary land) which is at risk through climate change.

In traditional times, the main governance structures on each island were the assemblies of elders known as the *Falekaupule* (Faaniu *et al.* 1976) on which every family was represented. Women and youth did not have speaking rights in the *Falekaupule*, although reports indicate that “their ideas might be presented there by a male family member”. Women had their own domains of responsibility and participation, and women and youth were most often regarded as the “implementers” of decisions made by the *Falekaupule*. While reports are that the roles of these traditional organisations were eroded during colonial times, in 1997, in addition to continuing to maintain culture and tradition, the *Falekaupule* were legislated to provide governance on each island and to establish an executive arm which would link into the central government. Furthermore, the 1997 legislation gave all people aged 18 years and over the right to participate in decision-making through the quarterly meetings of the *Falekaupule* assemblies. Anecdotal reports indicate that this right sits uneasily with tradition and has been variably observed across the eight main islands.

The *Falekaupule* and other village institutions set the cultural foundation for participation including a tradition of deliberative and consensual decision-making (Faaniu *et al.* 1976). The introduction of Christianity and the establishment of the Ekalesia Kelisiano Tuvalu (EKT, the Church of Tuvalu) provided another platform for peoples’ participation. Over 97% of the Tuvaluan population list themselves as members of the EKT and reports are that over time, the EKT and the traditional communal structures have become almost merged (People of Nanumea and Manuella 2004). The introduction of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other community-based agencies with both “modern” and traditional agendas provide other avenues for participation in contemporary Tuvaluan society, many coming under the umbrella of TANGO (Tuvalu Association of NGOs). A significant number of international government agencies also operate in Tuvalu nowadays; however, views were that these have tended to work through TANGO, another Tuvaluan NGO or the central and local government, rather than directly with communities. More recent avenues for community participation are the online discussion forums, some of which have been established by Tuvaluans for Tuvaluans. In addition, migrant groups and island community organisations, such as those in Auckland, offer opportunities for knowledge, skill and resource exchanges with homeland-based groups. However, the evidence showed that most connections between home and migrant communities were through family linkages and not organisations.

### *Tuvalu and climate change*

Chambers and Chambers (2007, pp. 294–295) state that “Tuvalu’s iconic role as ‘poster child’ for encroaching global disaster has been well established ...” And so, the risks Tuvalu faces as a result of climate change factors will not be discussed in this paper. However, it is important to note that despite being the climate change “poster child”, a number of Tuvaluan Prime Ministers have described their country’s voice in the climate

change debate as “small, rarely heard, and heeded to not at all” (cited in Sopoanga 2004, p. 11). Clearly, there has been a danger that those with “larger voices” are prescribing (or heavily recommending) solutions for Tuvalu with less attention to the Tuvaluan world view or, the ways Tuvalu’s communities may be responding to the drivers and consequences of climate change. A risk in portraying Tuvalu as vulnerable is that “vulnerability” is often interpreted as synonymous with “helplessness”. Another view is that this term may also spur a counter-reaction from the international community such as unwillingness to fund in-country adaptation activities if these are deemed to be “too late” (Lazrus 2009).

Although Tuvalu’s voice may be small, the government, the Church, some NGOs, foreign media and academics have gone to great lengths to highlight Tuvalu’s vulnerability<sup>5</sup> often with the aim of attracting external assistance to assist in minimising potential disruptions. There has been some room for community participation in these discussions. For example, the Tuvalu national adaptation programme of action (NAPA) was completed in 2007 by a team comprising government, non-government organisations, the Church and some civil society representatives (Ministry of Natural Resources Environment Agriculture and Lands (MNREAL) 2007). Other opportunities for communities to learn about and participate in climate change discussions include a national multi-sectoral network – the Tuvaluan Climate Action Network (TuCAN) – established in recent years by local professionals. TuCAN aims to work collaboratively to reach grassroot Tuvaluans in order to discuss climate change and what can be done to further local knowledges and beliefs.

### **Tuvaluans framing the debate**

This section presents the voices of community participants and how they are framing their understandings about climate change. This section is in four parts – local knowledge and beliefs, participation in planning, the possibilities of forced migration and future participation scenarios. A number of cross-cutting themes emerged as “important to the Tuvalu way of life and world view” and overarch this discussion. These were: the economy and economic security, the importance of land, people and social structures, and quality of life.

### ***Local knowledge and beliefs about climate change***

Participants did not share the sense of urgency and fear about their futures as is well expressed in the international media and reports.<sup>6</sup> A major finding was that 55% of the participants who are based in Tuvalu did not believe in climate change at all or said that they were unsure. In contrast, all Tuvaluans interviewed in New Zealand stated that they believed in climate change. Another important finding was that women in Tuvalu were more likely to state a belief in climate change (50% as against 40% of males), as were younger participants on both Funafuti and on the outer islands.

Of those who believed in climate change, a few considered the threat of being forced to migrate to be a human security issue – a threat to their fundamental human rights of nationality, statehood and culture. Others saw forced migration as disempowering to Tuvaluan people and that migration would make it difficult for them to meet their social, cultural, economic and spiritual needs. It was also believed that these difficulties would accentuate if the terms of migration were dictated by receiving nations.

When probed for their understanding of climate change, many saw climate change as being synonymous with sea level rise, despite the fact that this is only one possible consequence scientists have identified for Tuvalu. An analysis of the data showed that this perception correlated negatively with whether or not participants said they believed in climate

change (that is, those who equated climate change with sea level rise were less likely to believe in it). A significant number of participants likened scientific reports of sea level rise to the great flood. Furthermore, they did not believe that a great flood would come because in the flood narrative (Genesis 6–9), God made a covenant that he would never again destroy all living beings and the earth by a flood. By way of contrast, a small group believed that the scriptures supported the idea of climate change. They pointed to God’s warnings to Noah and drew parallels with the situation today. In their view, God was sending warnings to Tuvalu through the scientists, the researchers and the media that are visiting Tuvalu. For more on Tuvalu, climate change and theology see Fusi (2005) and Lusama (2004).

There is a clear urgency in ensuring a more widespread dissemination of accurate information about climate change and ensuring chances to discuss differences in scientific and spiritual beliefs exist. This is a necessary basis for any future planning.

### ***The need to plan and participate in planning***

Participants’ stated beliefs about climate change did not appear to correlate with whether or not they thought it was a priority to plan for climate change. But, their beliefs did seem to influence *whom* they thought should plan for this.

When asked about planning for climate change, responses varied from not wanting to talk about this, to beliefs that planning was a waste of time. Some agreed to the idea of *in-country* adaptation planning only (that is, they did not want to consider migration options) – while one felt climate change could be leveraged to market Tuvalu as a tourism site. Regardless of their beliefs, the majority of participants said that planning and preparation for both in-country and out-of-country adaptation measures should get underway immediately.

While those who did not believe in climate change were less mobilised to be part of addressing the challenges predicted by the scientific community, many appeared to be internally conflicted. That is, while they did not wish to openly state a belief in climate change, they believed sufficiently to state that Tuvalu’s leaders should plan and act. Most saw a role for all Tuvaluans to be involved – especially when it came to exploring migration options. In the words of one female participant “if government makes people aware, people can do their part and those overseas can contribute”.

It was not clear to what extent participants had discussed climate change at the individual and/or family level. However, observations were that many families were putting in place what could be termed adaptation practices such as installing additional water tanks and establishing *pulaka* in pots rather than directly in the ground. When questioned, these measures appeared to be driven by general factors such as changes in weather patterns and physical need, rather than in response to climate change. In fact, some participants regarded the environmental changes they were observing as part of a cycle of natural change.

### ***The possibility of forced migration***

Due to the extent of external interest in the possibility of forced migration, participants were asked what migration should look like and what considerations they saw to be important. On this point, participants expressed a strong desire to look only at in-country adaptation and mitigation options “at this stage”. A few noted that they had already prepared for an out-of-country option by having family members migrate and “create a base” abroad. Others said that their main strategy was to improve their family’s level of education and

English – this would ensure they were “better prepared” for whatever the future might bring.

At the same time, it became very clear that climate change was not the main motivator for families considering migration. In fact, climate change was the least cited factor. For example, a ranking of reasons for which participants would consider migration gave priority to health, jobs, children’s education, family, marriage, livelihood, fun/new experiences, migrants’ education, to get away from cultural obligations, and lastly climate change.

Participants then identified and weighed up the possibilities of two forms of migration:

- individual/family-led migration – such as people migrating to New Zealand under New Zealand’s immigration laws; and
- community-led migration/relocation – such as the people from Vaitupu who migrated and set up their community on Kioa Island.

Table 1 lists the arguments participants made for each option and the importance they placed on migration options which in their view “fitted with their community-based way of life”.

As seen, the community-led migration/relocation option received slightly more support than individual/family-led migration. Participants who appeared to have a better understanding of climate change and the international political environment suggested a combination of the two would be most appropriate.

Participants listed a number of factors and principles which they believed would need to be considered in the planning and preparation process whichever option was decided (Table 2). This discussion highlighted very compelling the importance to these participants of land, the Tuvaluan culture, and connectivity or people-based relationships with family

Table 1. Reasons for migrating as individuals/families versus as a community (identified by participants).

| Individual/family-led migration  | Community-led migration/relocation  |
|--|---|
| Individuals/families can go where and when they want (this is particularly important where there are other drivers for migration)  | Community-led migration fits better with the Tuvaluan community approach to problem-solving   |
| It is “easier” for individuals and families to find some way to meet the costs – the government does not have much money. “If the government can’t, individuals must” (female participant) | It is easier to maintain traditions, heritage, identity and family/community connectedness. “If we are going to be moved, it has to be to a new space called Tuvalu. This will help maintain the culture – if not, all will be lost” (female participant) |
| Individuals/families can come up with their own solutions and not rely on government   | Tuvalu can maintain its identity and autonomy. “If you separate the people from their land their identity will fade” (youth participant)  |
| The government is too slow and there is too much uncertainty if individuals/families wait for government   | Not all individuals/families have the social and economic capital that will enable them to migrate, therefore, the community needs to relocate together   |
| It is less complicated to organise   | It is easier for individuals because it would be led by Tuvalu’s leaders/government<br>There are already some available options (e.g. Kioa Island in Fiji)  |

Table 2. Factors/principles to be considered in planning for forced migration (identified by participants).

| Factors/principles       |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| Process                  | 1. Involve the people   |
| Timing                   | 2. Consider when to plan<br>3. Consider when to migrate   |
| Legal/<br>environmental  | 4. Consider ownership of land/sea if Tuvaluans depart Tuvalu  |
| Cultural/spiritual       | 5. Consider agreements with other States allowing migration   |
| Social/<br>psychological | 6. Preserve and maintain traditions, heritage, identity and religion overseas<br>7. Maintain and strengthen connections between Tuvaluans at home and abroad  |
| Knowledge                | 8. Prepare Tuvaluans for the mental impact of the move<br>9. Share knowledge of available climate change and migration options.<br>10. Share knowledge of life-style and culture in destination countries<br>11. Educate to thrive in new location (knowledge and skills) |
| Economic                 | 12. Consider who will be responsible for meeting costs of migration<br>13. Consider the long-term economic costs  |

and other community members. As seen also, this group emphasised their wish to be the masters of their own futures.

### *Future participation*

Communities described their participation in climate change-related discussions as minimal. Meaningful participation has no doubt been influenced by factors such as the widespread disbelief in climate change; the limited means of communication within Tuvalu and with island groups<sup>7</sup>; and the fact that much of the information and knowledge on climate change has originated from outside Tuvalu and so has not been easily accessed by the local population.

Questions probing people's views of whether and how they should participate in development dialogue generally, and participants' preferred channels of participation were asked. Aims were that these avenues might also be used for engendering climate change preparedness.

Participants linked "participation" with the idea of communal ownership of results, and expressed a desire to be involved in their communities and to own problems and solutions. They emphasised that "participation" was about being involved in the whole development process, not only the implementation stage which, as reported, had traditionally been the domain of women and youth. Figure 1 lists the mechanisms for participation that the participants identified and how they ranked these in order of relevance to their daily lives.

Figure 1 indicates that many of the mechanisms participants classified as relevant to them were traditional structures and/or those in close geographical proximity to where participants lived. Some participants indicated that while these mechanisms had served them well in the past, they may no longer be adequate to meet the complex development challenges Tuvalu now faces. An example here was Tuvalu's formal and informal oral networks for information dissemination which were felt to be insufficient in relation to climate change matters. Of additional importance was the fact that the mechanisms that the participants identified as most relevant (the family, traditional structures, local government and the Church) were not the institutions that are most dominant in climate change initiatives. These were instead the central government and NGOs.




Figure 1. Relevance of participation mechanisms to Tuvaluan-based participants.

Participants were cautious when speaking about what they described as the changing role of women, as they did not wish to offend tradition. That said, they acknowledged that modern life was leading to increased participation by women and youth in family decision-making and that these changes reflected other changes taking place in Tuvaluan society generally.

The data showed that women and educated youth based in Funafuti were more likely than men to be involved in NGOs. Furthermore, views were that it was in these NGOs that women learnt and practised their leadership and decision-making roles. It was also noted that climate change issues were more frequently debated in these NGO forums. Furthermore, it was said that most women and youth did not participate in *Falekaupule* discussions despite the 1997 legislation (supporting findings from Fairbairn-Dunlop *et al.* 2004); and that significant numbers of women and youth had little knowledge of

the 1997 legislation, what it implied, or of the present-day responsibilities of the *Falekaupule* and local government to liaise between government and island communities. In addition to information about climate change, this discussion highlighted the need for raising awareness about how government works and how communities can input into these processes.

These community discussions demonstrated that Tuvalu's communities do have a view on climate change and that the way they are framing the climate change debate does not mirror the way this is portrayed on the international stage. Shown also was the influence of religious beliefs and faith on people's perceptions about climate change, and the need for accurate information and discussion on these differences, with a view to fostering understanding and ensuring people are in a position to make informed decisions about their own, as well as Tuvalu's, future. Clearly, communities want to be involved in community and national planning in regard to both in-country and possible out-of-country solutions.

The differences in beliefs about climate change expressed (by females, males and youth) warrant more in-depth study, especially when set against traditional norms which place males and elders in the main decision-making roles.

This study has also shown that while climate change may not be seen to be the main driver for adaptive practices and/or migration, there is a strong awareness that family quality of life (e.g. health, education and economic security) is vulnerable in Tuvalu and in turn, that migration might be a desirable option for some. Should this be so, participants have stated their concern that issues around the meaning of land, the Tuvaluan culture and social systems must have a central place in these debates. Clearly, Tuvalu's strong extended family and island units are not only a source of identity, but are a major support against the worst changes which development can bring, including climate change.

Based on this research, investing in mechanisms which will ensure robust community participation is a major way of assisting Tuvalu face development challenges, including climate change. This includes investment in new technologies for communication which have the potential to empower Tuvaluans (at home and abroad) by linking them in to climate change discussions so that they are in a situation to make informed choices. Strengthening the existing preferred mechanisms and networks of engagement is also a priority, including the relationships between central government agencies, the local government and the *Falekaupule*. Revisiting the way *Falekaupule* organise so that youth and women might participate is another strategy, as is the promotion of online forums for civic engagement and information exchange (although face-to-face community discussions were generally preferred to on-line discussions). While outer island access to information and communications technology (ICT) was problematic at the time of this study, access has improved significantly since.

## Conclusion

This paper has provided a platform for Tuvaluan voices, particularly by exploring how these voices have been framing the climate change debate. As seen, despite Tuvalu being the "poster child" for climate change and the possibility of an entire population being forced to migrate, these and other scientific predictions have not sat comfortably with the understandings and beliefs about life of a significant number of the Tuvaluan population. These faith-based beliefs influence the extent to which people are willing to engage in or mobilise around climate change issues.

As outlined, the preferred avenues for participation were the family through to traditional and local governance structures and the Church, none of which have been used

extensively as a vehicle for climate change discussions. In addition, while there was a reluctance to begin planning for the possibility of forced migration, participants wanted particular thought to be given to land, culture, connectivity among the people, and empowerment of the people to be masters of their own futures. These factors reflect the core themes of importance to Tuvaluans that featured throughout the research process: the economy and economic security, the importance of land, people and social structures, and quality of life.

## Notes

1. See Paton (2009).
2. Kioa Island (Fiji) was purchased by the people of Vaitupu in 1947. The Fijian government agreed for up to 250 people to migrate from Vaitupu to Kioa. Two generations on, the Kioa Island Council reports that the population of Kioa is now around 600, although some are temporarily resident elsewhere in Fiji.
3. In 2006, there were 2635 people who identified as Tuvaluan (or part Tuvaluan) recorded in the New Zealand census.
4. *Pulaka* is a form of taro traditionally grown in pits. Some people now grow it in pots due to increased soil salinity.
5. For example in Pollock's (2005) film *Tuvalu: that sinking feeling*; Gallic *et al.*'s (2007) film *The disappearing of Tuvalu: trouble in paradise* and Huq and Ayers (2008). Notably, leaders in the EKT have also spoken on the global stage in terms of climate change. For example, speaking at the Pacific Conference of Churches and encouraging the Churches to get behind addressing climate change injustices.
6. The authors recognised that since this research was undertaken, earthquake-related tsunami-threats to Tuvalu may have enhanced awareness of the need for disaster preparedness and impacted on Tuvaluan' perceptions of their situation in relation to climate change as well.
7. Although ICT has improved considerably in Tuvalu since the primary research was undertaken.

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